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In this article we advocate using economics in combination with measures of 
experienced well-being to analyze how people can improve their choices. To 
introduce the issue, consider, for example, a fundamental result in consumer 
choice: that within each period the ratio of marginal utility to price should be equal 
across all goods. In principle, this result can help diagnose suboptimal choices and 
indicate appropriate prescriptions. For instance, an individual might ponder the 
aforementioned ratios, conclude that they are not equal for him or her, implying 
that he or she is choosing too much of some goods and too little of others, and 
adjust accordingly. 
In practice, the possibility of such diagnoses and prescriptions is almost 
never pursued. Instead, in traditional economics, it is common to presume that 
people are making choices in an optimal manner. That is, it is common to presume 
that people are making choices that maximize their happiness and cannot be 
improved upon (given extant budget and other constraints). 
An entirely different perspective prevails in popular discourse and most other 
disciplines. There, it is common to presume that people attempt to maximize their 
happiness but may not always be effective at doing so. The notion of (non random) 
mistaken choices, alien to standard economics, is part and parcel of both daily life 
and most social sciences.1 If people pursue happiness, but are not always good at 
achieving it, then one reason might be that people sometimes choose options that 
are suboptimal for them. Accordingly, outside of standard economics, it is common 
to encounter prescriptions suggesting that certain consumption profiles yield 
greater satisfaction than others, and that people would be better off if they 
switched their default choices towards these alternative profiles. 
Our aim here is to lay out – what we find to be – intriguing findings from 
empirical studies where choices are observed and experiences are rated. Our 
review contributes to the cross-disciplinary field of economics and psychology (see, 
e.g., Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin, 2004; De Cremer, 
Zeelenberg & Murnighan, 2006; Frey & Stutzer, 2007; Rabin, 1998) and establishes 
a closer link between the study of suboptimal choices and the research on 
                                                
1 Influential books applying this perspective include those by Gilbert (2006), by Kahneman 
(2011) and by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
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experienced well-being. In the last few decades, psychologists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, as well as a growing number of economists have accumulated a 
large volume of field data and experimental results on the pursuit of happiness and 
have formulated intriguing, testable theories of happiness (e.g., Diener, Kahneman 
& Helliwell, 2010; Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2006; Easterlin, 2010; Frey & Stutzer, 
2002; Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz, 1999; Layard, 2005; Stutzer & Frey, 2010; 
van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; Veenhoven, 1993).  
Our review is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; it focuses on 
two types of suboptimal choices, which are best introduced using a framework put 
forth by Kahneman and Snell (1992). Let C(X) be an individual’s chosen 
consumption profile given the possibility set X. Let U(x, X) be the experienced 
utility (or happiness) the individual accrues from the consumption of x given the 
possibility set X. Finally, let P(x, X) be the individual’s decision-time prediction of 
U(x, X). Ideally, within this framework, people would accurately predict the utility 
they will accrue from each option; that is, P would be consistent with U, at least in 
expectation. Moreover, people should choose the option with the greatest predicted 
utility; that is, C should maximize U (and P), again at least in expectation. It could 
be said, then, that optimal choice requires consistency of C, P, and U. In traditional 
economics, this consistency is reached by assumption. However, a great deal of 
data indicates that these variables are often inconsistent, yielding suboptimal 
choices. The two types of suboptimal choices we review either implicate a particular 
way in which C, P, and U can become inconsistent or suggest a discrepancy from 
the framework altogether (for related analyses see Benjamin et al., 2012; Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2009; Loeweinstein & Schkade, 1999; Mellers, 2000; Mellers & McGraw, 
2004; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) 
We begin by examining CPU inconsistencies that occur due to differences in 
“evaluation modes.” All evaluations are made in one or some combination of two 
basic modes: joint and separate. In joint evaluation (JE) mode, people confront 
multiple options simultaneously. In single evaluation (SE) mode, people are 
exposed to only one item and evaluate it in isolation. Much experimental work 
shows that because JE facilitates cross-item comparisons and SE does not, the two 
modes often yield systematically different revealed preferences.  
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We argue that choices usually arise in JE (which of these televisions should I 
buy?) whereas the consumption that follows from a choice occurs in SE (do I like 
the television I bought?). In addition, we argue that there is a fundamental bias to 
predicted utility: people choosing under JE appear to forecast their subsequent 
accrual of utility as if it too will occur under JE rather than SE. Consequently, 
systematic suboptimal choices may frequently arise.   
We next examine situations in which choice does not follow predicted utility 
and does not maximize it. These situations highlight a departure from the CPU 
framework itself. In particular, it appears that people often choose by invoking 
salient decision rules rather than forming a prediction of utility. To the extent that 
these decision rules fit the situation in which they are invoked, good choices may 
ensue. However, we suggest that decision rules are often too broadly applied; that 
is, they are frequently invoked in situations where they do not fit. Suboptimal 
choices then ensue. Returning to the language of our CPU framework, whenever 
decision rules are invoked, suboptimal choice may arise not because predicted 
utility yields a biased forecast of experience, but because choice does not depend 
on predicted utility. Indeed, we review experimental demonstrations in which 
predictions provide highly accurate forecasts of experienced utility, but choice 
simply does not follow predicted utility and instead depends on some salient rule. 
The CPU framework highlights issues that were perhaps first broached by 
Scitovsky (1976), who some time ago critiqued the standard economic assumption 
that people necessarily predict utility without bias and choose accordingly as 
“unscientific,” because “it seemed to rule out – as a logical impossibility – any 
conflict between what man chooses to get and what will best satisfy him (p. 4).” 
Similar arguments and frameworks have also been elaborated by March (1978), 
Schelling (1984) and Sen (1982), and most recently by Kahneman and Thaler 
(2006). The methods for improving happiness that research may eventually 
suggest will largely come down to aligning C, P, and U, so that choices indeed 
depend on predicted utility and that these predictions are unbiased forecasts of 
accrued utility. We address some normative issues concerning this stance in our 
concluding remarks. 
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We should also note that our focus is primarily on findings identified with 
behavioral decision research and on studies that consider happiness in terms of 
moment-by-moment, experienced utility with a specific outcome (cf., Frederickson 
& Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman, 2000; Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin, 1997). 
Research that examines happiness research in terms of global evaluations of 
satisfaction with life has recently been reviewed by Stutzer & Frey (2010). A 
discussion of the difference between the two approaches is provided by Helliwell 
(2006), Kahneman and Riis (2005) and Kahneman et al. (2004). Finally we do not 
address issues examined by the field of positive psychology (e.g., Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Sheldon, Kashdan & Steger, 2011) which investigates the 
impact of internal characteristics such as courage, wisdom, temperance, and 
humanity on happiness. We are concerned primarily with the effects of consumption 
on happiness. 
A. Evaluation Modes 
As we have mentioned, judgments and choices are made in one or some 
combination of two basic modes: joint and single. In joint evaluation (JE) mode, 
people confront multiple options simultaneously. In single evaluation (SE) mode, 
people are exposed to only one item and evaluate it in isolation. Critically, because 
JE facilitates cross-item comparisons and SE does not, the two modes may yield 
systematically different preferences or choices. 
 
A1. Different Preferences in Different Modes 
To illustrate SE and JE preference reversals, consider a study by Hsee (1998) 
involving two servings of Haagan Dazs ice cream, one involving 7 oz of ice cream 
contained in a 5 oz cup so it looked over-filled, and the other involving 8 oz of ice 
cream contained in a 10 oz cup so it looked under-filled.  Participants were 
presented either with both servings side by side, including the ounce information 
(JE) or with just one of them, also with the ounce information (SE), and indicated 
their willingness to pay for the item or items. The results revealed a marked 
preference reversal. In JE, participants were willing to pay more for the 8-oz, 
under-filled serving, but in SE they were willing to pay more for the 7-oz, over-filled 
serving (even though, objectively, it was worse). 
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The preferences are inconsistent in JE and SE, because the attributes that 
distinguish the two options– amount of ice cream and filling – vary in evaluability. 
The notion of evaluability refers to how easy or difficult it is to evaluate the 
desirability of different levels of an attribute when that particular level of the 
attribute is encountered alone, without other levels as a basis of comparison (Hsee, 
1996; Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Hsee, Rottenstreich & Xiao, 2005; 
Hsee & Zhang, 2010).  
The amount of ice cream is hard to evaluate in SE. Even if the ounce information is 
precisely specified; people in SE could not evaluate it with respect to its utility 
consequences. In contrast, whether a serving is underfilled or overfilled is easy to 
evaluate. Even without a side-by-side comparison across the two, an overfilled 
serving seems desirable and an underfilled serving seems undesirable.  As a result, 
when the two servings are encountered in SE, the primary determinant of 
willingness-to-pay is the easy-to-evaluate filling attribute. However, things change 
in JE, when people are exposed to the two servings in juxtaposition. In this 
circumstance, people readily note that one serving contains more ice cream (and 
also features a bigger cup!).  Thus, in JE people are willing to pay more for that 
serving. Similar evaluability-derived JE-SE preference reversals have been reported 
in many other contexts (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein & White, 1992; Kahneman, 
Ritov & Schkade, 1999; List, 2002). For a more detailed analysis and review on this 
topic, see Hsee and Zhang (2010). 
   The crux of our analysis is that in JE people will be sensitive to variation on 
both easy-to-evaluate and difficult-to-evaluate attributes, whereas in SE people will 
be sensitive only to variation on easy-to-evaluate attributes and not to variation on 
difficult-to-evaluate attributes. That is, preferences in the two modes will show 
systematically distinct weightings of the relevant attributes. 
 Our JE/SE analysis is also consistent with findings by Ariely, Loewenstein & 
Prelec (2003) concerning what these authors term “coherent arbitrariness.” For 
instance, in one of their studies, they observe that the amount of money people 
demand for exposure to a noise of a given duration can be easily influenced by a 
random anchor (suggesting arbitrariness) but their subsequent demands for 
compensation for exposure to noises is highly correlated with duration (suggesting 
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coherence). In our terms, the reason that the initial reaction is arbitrary is that it is 
elicited in SE and it is difficult to evaluate a noise of a particular duration in 
monetary terms. The reason that subsequent responses are coherent is that they 
are elicited in JE.  
 In sum, people in SE are relatively insensitive to variations on difficult-to-
evaluate attributes (except for variations in sign; sign, after all, is a dichotomous 
variable)2 and sensitive to variations on easy-to-evaluate attributes, and people in 
JE are sensitive to variations on both types of attributes. Preferences among 
options will diverge in JE and SE if these options involve a tradeoff between an 
easy-to-evaluate attribute and a difficult-to-evaluate attribute. Moreover, 
evaluations under either of the two modes will be more or less accurate with regard 
to experienced utility. 
 
A2. Predicted Utility versus Experienced Utility: Suboptimal Choices Due to 
Changing Evaluation Mode 
 Consider a hypothetical consumer who is interested in purchasing an 
apartment and who has narrowed her choices down to two equally expensive 
options. To simplify matters, assume that the two apartments are essentially 
identical, except that one is 2000 square feet in size and is in a location where the 
owner will experience a long commute, and the other is only 1500 square feet in 
size but is in a location where the owner will experience only a short commute. Now 
suppose that the consumer chooses to purchase the larger apartment. Here is a 
critical question: is the consumer’s choice likely to maximize her happiness? Or is it 
a suboptimal choice? 
       In the context of our example, differences in apartment size are highly 
evaluable and highly influential under JE at the time of choice, but matter less 
under SE at the time of the actual home consumption experience. Whether an 
apartment is 2000 square feet or 1500 square feet is qualitatively similar. In 
contrast, whether the owner will experience a short or a long commute is an 
attribute that is likely to make a difference in both choice in JE and subsequent 
                                                
2 Sometimes even sign is difficult to evaluate, see Ariely, Loewenstein & Prelec (2003). 
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experience in SE. Putting these observations together, we suggest that during JE 
comparison at decision time, the home buyer may believe that living in the larger 
apartment will make her happier. In subsequent SE consumption, however, having 
to commute less may lead to a happier life. It is in this way that a suboptimal 
choice may arise. 
 Generally speaking, choices are formed comparatively more under JE, 
whereas consumption unfolds more under SE. Moreover, choosers in JE often fail to 
recognize or account for the fact that consumption will occur under SE (i.e., 
alternatives will be less salient) (cf., Gilbert, Driver-Linn & Wilson, 2002; Van 
Boven, Dunning & Loewenstein, 2000; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003;  Hsee & 
Zhang, 2004).  
 The analysis above suggests a counterintuitive prescription: encouraging 
decision-makers to evaluate the choice option separately rather than 
simultaneously can improve their chances to choose the option that maximizes their 
consumption experience. The reason is that this strategy reduces the JE element 
and increases the SE element of the choice process, thereby making the evaluation 
mode during choice more aligned with that during consumption. To test this 
prediction, Yang et al. (2011) asked research participants to choose between two 
digital picture frames, one looking ugly (shining green) and featuring a slightly 
higher picture resolution, and the other looking nice (metallic silver) and featuring a 
slightly lower picture resolution. Pretests indicated that look was evaluable in SE 
and picture resolution was not. Half of the participants were encouraged to directly 
compare the two frames side by side during choice. The other half were not allowed 
to do so; instead, they had to examine one frame at a time, with a break in-
between. In support of our prediction, participants in the latter condition were 
happier during consumption, because more of them chose the nice-looking frame 
and look mattered more than resolution during SE consumption. 
 Suboptimal choices like these implicate systematic “mispredictions.” As we 
have mentioned, there appears to be a fundamental problem with predicted utility: 
people choosing under JE appear to forecast their subsequent accrual of utility as if 
it too will occur under JE rather than SE and that the same attributes are salient or 
get attention. This misprediction occurs not only because predictors and 
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experiencers are in different evaluation modes but also because predictors fail to 
put themselves in the evaluation mode of the experiencers. The inability to put 
oneself in the shoes of others or oneself in another situation was first put forth in a 
seminal article by Loewenstein (1996; see also Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & Rabin, 
2003).  
Another example of prediction errors due to evaluation modes comes from a 
study by Morewedge et al. (2010). Participants either predicted or experienced a 
relatively minor event, the eating of potato chips. In both cases, there was another 
food in the background, either an inferior food -- sardines, or a superior food -- 
chocolate. The authors found that compared with experiencers, predictors were 
more influenced by the food in the background.  
In contrast to the previous studies, the experiencers, like the predictors, 
were also faced with multiple items, and therefore by design, the experiencers were 
also in JE. Yet they naturally ignored the item in the background and focused only 
on the item they were experiencing. Therefore, in effect, they were in SE. The main 
insight from the Morewedge et al. study is that even if predictors and experiencers 
are both faced with multiple items, predictors naturally put themselves in the JE 
mode, comparing across the items, yet experiencers naturally put themselves in the 
SE mode, focusing primarily on the item they are consuming.  
 It is critical to note that we do not claim that forcing predictors making 
predictions under SE would necessarily lead to more accurate forecasts of 
experienced utility.  Our emphasis is rather on the shifting salience and evaluability 
of attributes between the decision phase and the consumption phase. Now 
conditions have to be formulated under which specific attributes are relatively 
overweighted in JE or relatively underweighted in SE (and vice versa). 
 
A3. The Relationship Between Income and Happiness 
 One of the most celebrated findings in the happiness literature, attributed to 
Richard Easterlin, is the observation that when real income increases across 
generations, happiness does not (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; 1995). 3  The Easterlin 
                                                
3 The empirical claim has recently been challenged; see Stevenson & Wolfers (2008) and 
Easterlin et al. (2010). 
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finding is often attributed to hedonic adaptation or increasing aspirations (see, e.g., 
Clark, Frijters & Shields, 2008; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; Easterlin, 2010; 
Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; Stutzer, 2004). Though these explanations are 
surely well-placed, the notion of evaluation modes provides a simple 
complementary explanation. The lack of correlation between income and happiness 
across generations may arise because absolute income and living standard are low 
in evaluability and each generation’s hedonic reaction to its income and living 
standard is largely a matter of SE, i.e., an evaluation of the relative income position 
at the time.  Of course, people in a new generation may occasionally compare 
themselves with their previous generation, but this comparison would not make the 
new generation happier, because the previous generation might also have 
occasionally compared themselves with their previous generation. 
 More recent research (Hsee et al., 2009) has made a distinction between two 
types of variables which many people care about and seek to improve: variables 
that are inherently evaluable, such as ambient temperature, amount of sleep, 
availability of friends, and those that are not inherently evaluable, such as amount 
of income (above a certain threshold), horsepower of a car, and square footage of a 
home. The research proposes and shows that improving inherently-evaluable 
variables for everyone over time increases the happiness of everyone, but 
improving inherently-inevaluable variables for everyone over time is merely a zero-
sum game.  
 
A4. Behavioral Models Describe Prediction, and Classical Theories Describe 
Consumption 
 Since their introduction, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
allied behavioral accounts have usually been treated as alternatives to normative, 
classical analyses. Essentially, it has been argued that the principles articulated by 
behavioral models are descriptively accurate, and that the principles articulated by 
classical analyses are largely descriptively inaccurate. Here, however, on the basis 
of results like those of Morewedge et al. (2010) and other studies we will shortly 
  11 
review, we are putting forward a conjecture.4 Behavioral and classical normative 
accounts may not be alternatives to one another. Instead, the two types of models 
may simply describe different evaluation modes; one may apply to choice and 
predicted utility while the other applies to actual accrual of utility during 
consumption. 
 A fundamental assumption of classical models is the notion that the carriers 
of value are final outcomes; that is, people care about and respond to end states.5 
On the other hand, a key departure for many behavioral models is the notion that 
the carriers of value are relative changes; that is, people care about gains and 
losses from a given reference point.  
 Morewedge et al.’s study suggests that in predictions the carriers of utility 
are indeed relative gains (chips rather than the inferior sardines) and relative losses 
(chips rather than the superior chocolate). People do appear to code and react to 
their future experiences not as “eating chips” per se, but as either “eating chips 
rather than chocolate” or “eating chips rather than sardines.” It is only given such 
coding of the potential outcomes in terms of relative position that predictions may 
differ in the first place. Yet, Morewedge et al.’s study also suggests that in 
consumption the carriers of utility are end states, the taste of the chips. Critically, 
when people actually eat chips, they do not experience the chips differently given 
one scenario rather than the other; in actual experience all that seems to matter is 
the end state. It is chips and only chips that are consumed and that yield utility. In 
generally, predictions often occur in JE and are sensitive to reference information. 
In contrast, consumption often occur in SE and are insensitive to reference 
information.  
 By our conjecture, then, the principles underlying prospect theory and 
related behavioral models are indeed more accurate descriptions of choices than 
                                                
4 See also Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & Rabin (2003) who argue that loss aversion is a 
projection bias as people underestimate adaptation to new circumstances. 
5  The economic framework can well be extended to deal with procedural utility 
complementing traditional accounts of outcome utility (Frey, Benz & Stutzer, 2004). It is 
taken into account that people have preferences about procedures that lead to outcomes. 
This also involves the evaluation procedures (e.g., JE or SE) under which people make 
decisions. 
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are classical accounts. Ironically, though, they are accurate descriptions of choices 
that often depend on inaccurate predictions of experienced utility – and that are 
thus often suboptimal choices. In some sense, behavioral models may be accurate 
scientific theories of people’s inaccurate lay theories of utility accrual. 
 
A5. Misallocation Due to Prediction Bias 
Prediction errors, whether due to evaluation mode or due to other reasons, 
systematically affect people’s allocation of scarce resources. This subsection 
emphasizes this economic consequence for different applications and mentions 
some additional aspects leading to utility misprediction. 
Many economic decisions are best understood as trade-offs that involve the 
allocation of money, effort and time. Then, for at least two alternatives, predictions 
about consumption experience are necessary. Following our framework, these 
predictions are formed in JE and can systematically differ in their adequacy. If 
people choose options according to a biased evaluation, their experienced utility will 
be lower than what they could otherwise enjoy. Moreover, they consume different 
goods with different attributes and pursue different activities than in a situation 
where either no option in the choice set poses a prediction problem or the degree of 
prediction bias is similar across alternatives. 
Asymmetric prediction biases are most likely if trade-offs across life domains 
are to be undertaken.  People often overestimate experienced utility from material 
consumption, because they underestimate the power of hedonic adaption to 
material living standards (see, e.g., van Praag, 1993 and Stutzer, 2004). In 
contrast to positive experiences derived from material goods, positive experiences 
from social, challenging and autonomous activities are less susceptible to hedonic 
adaptation as they are constantly renewed. Accordingly, in trade-offs, too much 
weight is given to material goods relative to goods and activities that involve social 
engagement, or provide for the experience of competence and autonomy (Stutzer & 
Frey, 2007).  
This is consistent with the general claim that people overvalue income 
relative to leisure and that the “work-life balance” of individuals today is distorted. 
People are induced to work too much and to disregard other aspects of life. This 
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proposition has been forcefully put forward for the United States, where individuals 
are said to be “overworked” (Schor, 1991). A related issue is status from 
conspicuous consumption. Competing for status involves negative externalities and 
therefore too much effort (from an aggregate perspective) is invested in gaining 
status and acquiring “positional goods” (Frank, 1985; 1999). If there is a 
comparatively large prediction bias in experience from consumption, the distortions 
of competing for status in consumption are magnified.  
There is a range of further phenomena, which fit into the framework of 
asymmetric prediction bias. The prediction bias arising because people 
underestimate adaptation to new situations has been neatly introduced in 
theoretical models of intertemporal decision-making (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & 
Rabin, 2003). These models can help to understand misguided purchase of durable 
goods or consumption profiles with too much consumption early on in life.  
Utility misprediction might also help to better understand individual choices 
that all involve a trade off with commuting (our example in section A2). The 
commuting decision involves the trade-off between the salary or the quality of 
housing on the one hand and commuting time on the other hand. Rational utility 
maximizers only commute when they are compensated. However, when people 
overestimate utility from goods serving extrinsic desires because they are salient, 
they are expected to opt for too much commuting and suffer lower experienced 
utility. In an empirical test using data on reported subjective well-being, people’s 
decision to commute for longer or shorter hours was analyzed (Frey and Stutzer, 
2012). It is found that commuting is far from being fully compensated. Moreover, 
people do not adapt to commuting but seem to adapt to a higher labor income. If 
this asymmetry is neglected in trade-offs, suboptimal choices result.  
There is a long tradition of scholarship arguing that individuals tend to focus 
too much on material goods and disregard goods providing non-material benefits 
(see Lane, 1991; Lebergott, 1993). Most importantly, Scitovsky (1976) claimed 
that “comfort goods” are over-consumed compared to goods providing 
“stimulation”. The former are described as defensive activities, providing protection 
from negative affect. They consist of the consumer goods achieved through rapid 
productivity growth. In contrast, stimulation comes from creative activities 
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providing novelty, surprise, variety and complexity. These aspects emphasize the 
renewal of pleasurable experiences. According to Scitovsky, stimulation is at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to comfort goods because there is a higher cost 
of access to them and consumers are myopic about the future benefits from 
stimulating activities. The argument about systematic misallocation in consumption, 
however, also fits in with a framework of asymmetric prediction bias as immediately 
accessible acquisition utility puts comfort goods to an advantage relative to 
stimulation that might even require some consumption capital.  
Summary 
 Inconconsistencies between predicted and experienced utilities, including 
those stemming from JE-SE differences,  are important causes of suboptimal 
choices, just like mental accounting and narrow bracketing (on choice bracketing 
see, e.g., Read, Loewenstein & Rabin 1999).6 While conceptually different, both 
phenomena deal with mistakes that arise because choices are susceptible to the 
framing of decisions.  
 Most people believe that more of a desirable outcome is better. They thus 
relentlessly pursue more – jobs with more income, cameras with more pixels, cars 
with more power, and homes with more square-footage. Misprediction and 
suboptimal choice may both lie at the root of such “more-seeking” and stymie its 
success. Predictions and choices occur relatively more in JE, and utility is 
experienced relatively more in SE. Under JE, people expect more to be better. 
Under SE, people who possess more may not experience more as better (if what 
they have chosen more of is no longer salient when they consume) and may thus 
not achieve more happiness. Life teaches us all that the pursuit of more is not the 
pursuit of happiness. The research we have reviewed elaborates on that lesson.  
 
B. Decision Rules 
 The previous section reviewed evidence suggesting that people often fail to 
choose the optimal option because they fail to accurately predict which option will 
                                                
6 Similar to our argument on JE, Read, Loewenstein & Rabin (1999, p. 192) note that people 
can too broadly optimize “because bracketing facilitates the consideration of factors that are 
given little weight during narrow bracketing, it can exacerbate errors people make in 
anticipating the role these factors play in their experienced well-being.” 
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yield the highest experienced utility. In this section, we examine another cause of 
suboptimal choice, the tendency to base choices on salient rules rather than on 
predicted utility. 
 
B1. Choice without Prediction of Utility 
In a landmark study, Simonson (1990) asked one group of participants to 
make simultaneous choices of three snacks; they would consume the first snack 
immediately, the second snack in one week’s time, and the third snack in two 
weeks’ time. He asked a second group of participants to make sequential choices of 
a snack just before each of these three consumption occasions. Most simultaneous 
choosers decided to have a variety of snacks, whereas most sequential choosers 
decided to have their (apparent) favorite snack on every one of the three 
consumption occasions. That is, simultaneous choosers showed a tendency towards 
variety seeking, whereas sequential choosers showed a tendency against variety 
seeking. 
The different choices formed by simultaneous and sequential choosers 
suggest that at least one of these groups will be experiencing a level of utility that 
is lower than what she or he could achieve. In reviewing the contrast between JE 
and SE, we suggested that in that domain, biases in utility prediction were the 
source of incongruency between choice and experienced utility. It may be natural, 
then, to surmise that systematic biases in utility prediction may be implicated in the 
different choices formed by Simonson’s sequential and simultaneous choosers. 
Clearly, different choices could arise if either simultaneous choosers or sequential 
choosers do not accurately forecast experienced utility. 
Critically, however, Simonson’s study also included a third group of 
participants. The results revealed by this third group appear to rule out the 
possibility of systematically faulty utility predictions and rule in an even more 
intriguing hypothesis – the lack of utility predictions. Simonson’s third group 
participated at the same time as the simultaneous choosers. Rather than being 
asked to make choices, this group was asked to predict what the experienced utility 
in the three occasions would be like under different scenarios. Incredibly, the 
predictors forecast better feelings with low variety than with high variety. The 
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implication is that simultaneous choosers could predict, if asked, that lesser variety 
would yield a better experience and that greater variety would yield a worse 
experience. Yet, they chose greater variety. Why would they do such a thing? 
We suggest that simultaneous choosers simply did not base their decisions 
on predictions of experience. That is, simultaneous choosers formed their choices 
on a basis other than a prediction of ensuing utility. In particular, we suggest that 
simultaneous choosers came to a decision by applying a seemingly appropriate 
rule: seek variety in most circumstances (a related hypothesis was put forward by 
Ratner, Kahn & Kahneman, 1999). 
Indeed, much research indicates that decision makers often fail to base their 
decisions on predicted utility. Instead they base their decisions on salient rules or 
principles (e.g., Ames, Flynn & Weber, 2004; Drolet 2002; Drolet, Luce, Simonson 
2009; March, 1994; Prelec & Herrnstein, 1991; Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999; 
Rottenstreich & Kivetz 2006; Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Nowlis, 2000). 
For instance, Amir & Ariely (2007) observed that most people predicted 
greater happiness from purchasing a ticket for a concert that would occur one week 
after the day of purchase rather than later the same night, presumably because a 
week’s delay would allow for anticipation and savoring of the experience. 
Nevertheless, most people were unwilling to pay extra for a concert one week into 
the future compared to a concert later that night. Why would people not pay for 
something that they know will enhance their utility? Amir and Ariely argue that such 
decisions arise from reliance on a “don’t pay for delays” rationale as opposed to 
pure predicted utility.7  
A suggestive related example was offered much earlier by Arkes & Blume 
(1985). These authors asked participants to suppose that they had purchased a 
$100 ticket for a weekend ski trip to one locale and a $50 ticket for a weekend ski 
trip to another locale. Unfortunately, it turned out that the two trips were for the 
same weekend. The tickets were not refundable, and thus the participants had to 
choose which of the two tickets to use and which to let go unused. Though 
participants believed the lower price trip would be more enjoyable, the majority 
                                                
7 An anonymous referee suggested the alternative norm “pay the same for the same good 
regardless of the timing”. 
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chose to take the more expensive trip. Arkes and Blume argue that this pattern of 
preferences reflects appeals to a “waste not” rationale. If so, we would again have 
an instance in which a decision is made by the application (or over-application) of 
an appealing rule – even when this rule yields a lower level of experienced utility. 
 Another related phenomenon is what Hsee et al. (2003) term “lay 
rationalism,” a pattern by which participants choose a seemingly rational option 
(e.g., one that is financially more valuable) over an alternative which, when asked, 
they agree would make them happier. One such demonstration draws on decades 
of research suggesting that people prefer improving sequences over deteriorating 
sequences (e.g., Ariely & Carman, 2003; Ariely & Zauberman, 2003; Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). In one study (Hsee et al., 2003), 
participants were offered a choice between two sets of four dinners that were to be 
enjoyed over a four-week period. In one set, the dinners increased in price over the 
course of the four weeks, but the total overall monetary value of the dinners (i.e., 
the sum of their prices) was relatively lower. In the second set, the four dinners 
decreased in price over the course of the four weeks, but the total overall monetary 
value of the four dinners was relatively higher. Participants predicted that they 
would experience greater enjoyment from the set of dinners with increasing yet 
lower overall prices but tended to choose the set of dinners with the decreasing yet 
higher overall prices. 
 The famous “taxicab” study by Camerer et al. (1997) can also be interpreted 
as reflecting rule-based choice rather than prediction-based choice. In that study, 
Camerer et al. observed that novice New York City taxi drivers tended to adopt a 
particular daily income target and to work only until they hit their target each day. 
Following such a rule is suboptimal, because it means working many hours when 
demand for taxicabs is low and few hours when demand is high. Indeed, 
experienced taxi drivers worked longer hours when demand was high than when it 
was low, as appropriate. By our analysis, novice cab drivers do not formulate a 
prediction of demand, perhaps because they are simply not knowledgeable enough 
to do so or do not have a natural inclination to do so. In the absence of a 
prediction, they devolve to rule-based behavior. Experienced cab drivers, in 
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contrast, can and do form a prediction and base their work decisions on this 
prediction. 
  The demonstrations just reviewed are quite diverse but share a critical 
similarity. In all these demonstrations people are forming choices that, when asked, 
they explicitly predict will yield suboptimal utility levels. Thus, these decisions 
appear to proceed without the formation of a utility prediction or at least not on the 
basis of predicted utility. Instead, the basis for such decisions appears to be some 
salient rule or rationale. Whenever choices are formed on the basis of rules or other 
considerations that neglect predicted utility, choices may likely fail to maximize 
experienced utility. 
 
B2. Rules as an Antidote to Impulsivity 
 An impulsive decision is one that selects an option offering a satisfactory 
experience that is available in the near term over an alternative that offers a better 
overall experience but is only available with some significant delay. Consider a 
choice between chocolate cake and fruit salad for dessert. The chocolate cake may 
offer greater immediate gratification, but the fruit salad may contribute to the 
avoidance of obesity and other health problems and to a longer life. Thus, though 
opting for the chocolate cake may offer a more satisfactory immediate experience, 
opting for the fruit salad may with time offer a better overall experience. 
 Impulsive decisions are almost certainly multiply determined. People may 
behave impulsively because they do not understand the consequences of their 
behavior. For example, some people smoke, because they do not believe that 
smoking leaves them vulnerable to many pernicious diseases. In many instances, 
however, people make impulsive choices with a keen awareness of the potential 
consequences – they simply cannot resist the temptation (e.g., Kivetz & Simonson, 
2002b; Loewenstein, 1996; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). 
The topic of impulsivity has received extensive attention in both psychology 
and economics (see Ainslie, 2001; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & 
Vohs, 2003 & 2004; Christensen-Szalanski, 1984; Prelec & Herrnsten, 1991; 
Rachlin & Raineri, 1992; Schelling, 1980; 1984; Thaler, 1980; Thaler & Sherfrin, 
1981). We would like to offer a somewhat novel two-step analysis of this topic that 
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stresses the role of rules, and which surprisingly suggests the conjecture that 
excessively patient behavior may be as prevalent as excessively impulsive 
behavior. 
First, we suggest that many rules are instituted in part as antidotes against 
impulsivity. That is, rules play a role as self-control mechanisms that aid the 
decision-maker to maximize delayed happiness or overall experienced utility. 
“Waste not,” “don’t pay for delays,” and “lay rationalism” are all rules that clearly 
promote less impulsive decisions over more impulsive decisions. Adherence to 
these and similar principles can tether the decision maker to a policy or guideline 
that deters rash reactions. 
For instance, suppose an employee who is approaching retirement and who 
has little savings receives a cash bonus. Suppose further that she can either save 
the bonus for retirement or spend it on a luxury cruise. Taking the cruise is 
enjoyable in the short run, but saving the money may be a greater benefit in the 
long run. Opting for the cruise would constitute an impulsive decision. Instead, lay 
rationalism would encourage the soon-be-retiree to save the money. Although a 
few decision rules encourage immediate gratification (e.g., “life is short, enjoy it 
while you can”), most rules have at least some of the flavor of self-control 
mechanisms. 
The observation that rules may be instantiated as self-control mechanisms 
accords with the notion that reliance on rules may often simplify the task of making 
many related decisions. By providing an overarching policy or guideline, rules can 
eliminate the need to carefully ponder (or the possibility of rashly reacting to) each 
of very many similar decisions. Though the policy or guideline instantiated by some 
rule may not yield the maximum level of experienced utility, it may, at low cost, 
generate a portfolio of decisions that does yield a generally sufficient (and perhaps 
even high) level of experienced utility. Indeed, by instantiating a measure of self-
control and discipline, adherence to a rule or principle only enables a level of long-
term experienced utility that is higher than would otherwise be feasible. 
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B3. When Are We Excessively Impulsive and When are We Excessively 
Patient? 
Though this view of rules casts them in a good light, there is an important 
caveat which forms the second step of our analysis. Rules are a simplifying tool; by 
enacting an overarching policy one may indeed avoid thinking about or reacting to 
each minute decision that one encounters. But how does one know which situations 
call for the application of a particular rule and which do not? How can one ensure, 
for example, that one is foreclosing rashness in a circumstance where one really 
should do so? The use of rules may simplify some matters, but understanding which 
rules are relevant when is no simple matter (for an excellent account of this issue, 
see Kahneman, 2011). 
When one considers this perspective, it seems that many rules and self-
control devices can help in some circumstances and hurt in others. If the options 
the decision maker faces entail a genuine tradeoff between immediate and delayed 
utility, self-control rules will by definition be helpful. Otherwise, the application of 
such rules may be harmful. To illustrate, consider again the soon-to-be retiree. If 
she is poor, taking a cruise and saving for retirement indeed entail a tradeoff 
between immediate and delayed utility. In this circumstance, self-control rules may 
well enable her to experience greater delayed utility and possibly also greater 
overall experienced utility. On the other hand, if the soon-be-retiree is wealthy, 
taking a cruise may dominate saving for retirement. In this circumstance, taking a 
cruise will not affect her financial condition, and she is thus not facing the same 
kind of tradeoff between immediate and later utility. If she nevertheless adheres to 
rules that entail self-control in such a circumstance, she may lower her overall 
experienced utility. She may never be able to enjoy the fruits of her riches. 
More generally, we speculate that individuals frequently do not effectively 
distinguish between circumstances that involve a tradeoff of immediate and delayed 
utility versus circumstances that do not. People’s behavior may thus be too uniform 
to effectively maximize their experienced individual well-being. Most critically, the 
notion that rules are difficult to apply properly and frequently engender excessively 
uniform behavior provides a framework for predicting both when people will be 
excessively impulsive and when they will be excessively patient. In particular, if 
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people’s behavior is excessively uniform then (i) they will be too impulsive when 
short-term goals entail substantial long-term costs, and (ii) they will be excessively 
patient when a short-term gain does not entail substantial long-term costs. Thus, 
though the economics literature has largely focused on impulsivity, our analysis 
suggests that excessive patience may also be a significant impediment to people’s 
pursuit of happiness.8 
Corroboration of this conjecture is provided by recent research. Kivetz & 
Simonson (2002a,b; Kivetz & Keinan 2006) were perhaps the first to emphasize 
problems of hyperopia or excessive patience. They documented several instances in 
which many consumers tended to deprive themselves of indulgence or leisure in 
favor of utilitarian goods or work – to an apparently excessive degree. Indeed, the 
consumers in question often employed pre-commitments and rules to force 
indulgence. For example, these consumers sometimes chose compensation in the 
form of hedonic luxury items over cash compensation of equal or greater value and 
explained their decision as intended to guarantee that the reward not be spent on 
necessities. 
Shu (2004, 2005) reviews a vast array of evidence suggesting that 
retirement savings are buffered too long. For instance, the elderly often underspend 
their savings and die with more money than they intended (Carroll & Samwick, 
1997; Palumbo 1999). In addition, it appears that the elderly vastly underutilize 
reverse mortgages, which allows people to “cash out” the equity in their homes 
without having to repay the loan until after death. Studies estimate that the 
demand for reverse mortgages should be anywhere from 3 to 9 million households, 
while actual use of reverse mortgages has ranged from 6,000 to 12,000 per year 
(Venti & Wise, 1991) whereby the inheritance motive is arguably difficult to 
separate.  
Returning to domains that are closer to consumption than savings, Shu 
(2008; see also Shu and Gneezy, 2010) argues that for most consumption items, 
the default behavior is to consume quickly, but that there are some items for which 
                                                
8 A notable exception is the work by Bénabou & Tirole (2004) on willpower and personal 
rules. In their model, an individual can be too patient because he interprets each choice as 
a test of his willpower and is concerned of appearing too impulsive to himself what would 
reduce his self-control.  
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the default is to not consume now. These items are the ones for which two rules 
seem applicable. The first rule is “occasion matching,” and is based on the desire to 
maximize experienced utility by choosing the specific consumption occasion that 
best matches the item – i.e., an expensive bottle of wine should be consumed on a 
very special night when it will most be enjoyed. The second rule emphasizes an 
“option preservation” rationale. It stems from the desire to minimize the chance of 
immediate loss; the old tomato should be eaten tonight (and the better one saved) 
if it will otherwise go to waste. Note that both of these rules have as a purpose the 
maximization of experienced utility – yet they may still engender excessively 
patient behavior that fails to actually maximize it. 
An important feature of items for which the default is not to consume now is 
their framing within a larger temporal context. The timing decision is seen as 
existing within a sequence of many such decisions; if the option is not used now, 
there are multiple later opportunities waiting (thus the desires to occasion match 
and preserve options). For example, using frequent flier miles now means that they 
will not be available for a future special trip, and using the new tomato now (and 
discarding the old one) means that there will be no tomatoes available tomorrow. 
Shu’s rules can lead to a type of “hoarding” behavior, where items are saved 
just because they might be needed someday. The hoarder fears being unprepared 
for a future need or losing an important item that might be useful someday. 
Indeed, a substantial industry in clutter removal advice has evolved to deal with 
this frequent behavior. As one expert on clutter writes,  
 
“…Those three words, 'just in case,' have caused more people to 
accumulate excess clutter than any other words I know of. Just in 
case I need an empty jar/spare rubber band/Spanish dictionary/cat 
carrier; or just in case I learn to play the piano/lose some 
weight/move to another climate/learn to sew/become an artist/find 
a partner, implies that we don't trust that we have what we need 
now…. [O]ne of the most important things we can learn is to live in 
the present moment. If we are so wrapped up in the future, we use 
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up the energy that we could devote to what our needs are right 
now.” 
 
Work on the phenomenon of cupboard castaways is also consistent with this 
hoarding behavior (Wansink, Brasel & Amjad, 2000). Cupboard castaways are often 
obscure kitchen items that are saved as “just in case” ingredients for rare recipes. 
The individual may purchase the item for a specific need, but when the need fails to 
materialize, the item is preserved rather than discarded. Some estimates indicate 
that up to 12% of grocery purchases may end up as castaways. 
Finally, note that Amir and Ariely’s demonstration of consumers’ reluctance 
to pay for delays, Arkes and Blume’s demonstration of consumers’ reliance on 
“waste not, want not” rules, Camerer et al.’s cab driver study, and Hsee et al.’s 
demonstrations of lay rationalism all constitute specific instances in which people, 




 In this section we have examined suboptimal choices that occur not because 
of utility misprediction but because of the absence of utility prediction. Simonson’s 
participants predict that they would enjoy consistency over variety – yet they 
choose variety. Camerer et al.’s novice taxicab drivers are apparently not apt to 
form a prediction of demand – so they supply their labor in a way that is insensitive 
to market conditions. Hsee’s participants would prefer to receive one set of dinners, 
but adherence to lay rationalism steers them to a less preferred option. These 
examples demonstrate how reliance on rules can often be too rigid. To the extent 
that understanding which rules should be applied to which circumstances is a 
difficult matter, people will frequently overapply rules in a way that harms their 
consumption experience. Perhaps most importantly, rules that are meant to temper 
self-control problems of excessive impulsivity may frequently be invoked in 
circumstances where they are not warranted and actually yield excessive patience. 
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C. Concluding Remarks 
We have reviewed two distinct types of suboptimal choices. The first arises 
when choices follow predicted utility, but predicted utility is inconsistent with 
experienced utility. In particular, choices and predicted utility may reflect JE 
considerations, but actual experience may proceed under SE. The second arises 
when people fail to make predictions about utility and instead base their choices on 
salient decision rules. These decision rules are often applied to situations which 
they do not fit very well. 
Our review has been guided by the belief that economists may be able to 
leverage their analytic tools and methods to generate prescriptions that solve many 
instances of suboptimal choice. That is, in our opinion analysis including 
experienced individual well-being may suggest numerous prescriptive possibilities. 
For instance, a sophisticated understanding of just how utility is predicted and 
experienced under JE and SE may bring forth many possibilities for improving 
people’s choices. 
Future economic research of suboptimal choice may also shed light on two 
issues of which we do not currently have much knowledge. First, why do people 
often fail to recognize suboptimal choices? At least part of the answer lies in the 
very nature of counterfactuals. There are some suboptimal choices that people may 
simply never have the opportunity to learn about. For instance, if a person always 
makes a certain choice under JE, they might never experience the SE-optimality of 
some non-chosen alternatives. On the other hand, there are likely many suboptimal 
choices that people do detect on their own. Their subsequent regret about mistakes 
may drive them towards undoing their suboptimal choice. It would certainly be 
useful to delineate the conditions under which suboptimal choices will persist and 
the conditions under which they may sometimes be eliminated. 
Second, we currently know very little about the market consequences of 
suboptimal choices. We would like to only raise two thoughts. Suppose that a 
consumer has bought a product in JE choice and is not happy with it during SE 
consumption. Will she be less likely to buy the same product in the future? We do 
not know. It is possible that even though she is unhappy, she will not realize that 
she could be happier if she had chosen an alternative product and therefore she 
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may not regret her decision and will continue to buy the same product in the future. 
That is essentially the point we made in the previous paragraph, that is, people do 
not know the counterfactuals and therefore do not learn. On the other hand, it is 
also possible that she is so unhappy with the bought product during consumption 
that she will not buy the same product again, regardless of whether she is aware of 
the counterfactuals. 
Consider another scenario, if a seller of consumer electronics faces a one-
time transaction with a consumer, she might try to sell the consumer some 
expensive extra gadget with technical advantages that are easy to evaluate but are 
unlikely to provide much extra experienced utility.  To do so, she would want to 
make sure to present the entire transaction in as maximally a JE manner as 
possible.  On the other hand, if the seller expects a long-term relationship with the 
consumer, she might present the items in SE so that the consumer is more likely to 
make an optimal choice rather than a suboptimal choice, avoid any regret about his 
or her decisions, and thus continue his or her relationship with the seller.  In 
general, the mode of interactions between sellers and buyers and thus the 
endogenous prevalence of suboptimal choices may be determined by market factors 
and subject to market dynamics. 
The debate about whether people do or do not make suboptimal choices, 
where standard economic assumptions are pitted against intuition and other social 
sciences, is not a mere academic exercise. This debate may have critical policy 
implications. If people never make mistakes, then no intervention or paternalism is 
needed. If people indeed make systematic mistakes, then extreme notions of 
consumer sovereignty should perhaps be re-examined and in some cases 
abandoned in favor of more paternalistic approaches (Frey & Stutzer, 2006; Thaler 
& Sunstein 2008). 
In our review, we have given priority to experienced utility as a criterion of 
individual welfare. However, we are not identifying consumption utility with 
happiness. We are aware that different indicators of individual welfare capture 
different aspects of people’s pursuit of happiness. For example, people might gain 
utility from exerting will power because they have resisted a temptation. Or, they 
may judge their live favorably because their life course contributes to positive self-
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signaling, identity, goal completion, mastery or meaning (for economic analyses of 
such motives see, e.g., Akerlof & Kranton 2000 and Loewenstein 1999). We 
believe, however, that experienced utility is in many cases a highly relevant 
evaluation standard for consumption choices. 
Regardless of whether experienced utility is the ultimate criterion, this article 
has reviewed evidence that decision and experienced utilities can be systematically 
different and that people do not always make decisions that maximize experienced 
utility. We hope that future analysis in this vein can further refine our 
understanding of the optimality of people’s choices and thereby contribute to 
people’s pursuit of happiness. 
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